Modern philosophy of mind addresses many mysteries, but it seems that maybe the most mysterious is how human agents become involved in worldly affairs without having to think and deliberate; how beliefs and desires are brought about before they ‘come to word’; how actions get their course before the ‘self’ can report on their emergence; and how mental contents and motives for action are generated with no concepts in sight and no representations in mind. The actual trends are, however, predominantly conscious- and thought-centred, and largely insensitive to all that cannot be captured in intellectualist terms. They are marked by the hegemony of thought, conceptual chauvinism, repressions of representationalism, the dictate of volition, and the dogma of deliberation. Consequently, they take for granted that thoughts are consciously controlled, that actions originate in deliberation, and that behaviour is basically a result of some sort of propositional plan. As such, they are hardly in a position to provide an adequate account of the non-conscious, implicit, non-conceptual, skilled, and automatic. Yet with all the power of propositionality, the reign of reason, and conceptual conduct, modern theorists are concerned with just a fraction of what makes human mentality; the thinking mind – linguistically structured, explicit in form, rational, and volitional – is but a tiny bit of what constitutes us as mindful beings. All those processes, usually affiliated with ‘higher’ cognitive mental activities, are late products in the course of the emergence of the mental.