In the last decades, game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous

applications in a wide variety of areas, e.g. economics, political science, law and

psychology. This strong response results not least from the fact that games are

models of social organisations and the solutions are possible stable standards of

behaviour. In this way, game theory applies social standards to design universal

rules and solutions which yield important and novel insights.

The relevance and rigour of game theoretic approaches for economic modelling

have been highlighted by awarding the ‘The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic

Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel’—better known as the ‘Nobel Prize in

Economics’—to researchers in this field (e.g. 1994, John F. Nash Jr., John C.

Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten; 1996, William S. Vickrey; 2005, Robert J. Aumann

and Thomas C. Schelling; 2007, Leonid Hurwicz, Eric S. Maskin and Robert B.

Myerson; 2012, Alvin E. Roth and Lloyd S. Shapley).

Distinguishing between cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, the first

assumes players who have different goals and are unwilling or unable to make

binding agreements. This leads to the question of strategic behaviour and strategic

decisions of the players. In contrast, the second assumes the players have identical

targets and are willing and able to commit themselves: this reveals a totally different

range of problems. One of these is the question of sharing fairly the jointly generated

result. The demand to share fairly is well accepted, but the crucial question of how

to define ‘fairness’ is a very complicated issue.